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ABSTRACT In the use of a cloud storage, sharing of data with efficient access control is an important
requirement in addition to data security and privacy. Cui et al. (IEEE Trans. on Comp. 2016) proposed
key-aggregate searchable encryption (KASE), which allows a data owner to issue an aggregate key that
enables a user to search in an authorized subset of encrypted files by generating an encrypted keyword
called trapdoor. While the idea of KASE is elegant, to the best of our knowledge, its security has never
been discussed formally. In this paper, we discuss the security of KASE formally and propose provably
secure schemes. The construction of a secure KASE scheme is non-trivial, and we will show that the KASE
scheme of Cui et al. is insecure under our definitions. We first introduce our provably secure scheme, named
first construction, with respect to encrypted files and aggregate keys in a single-server setting. In comparison
with the scheme of Cui et al., the first construction is secure without increased computational costs. Then,
we introduce another provably secure scheme, named main construction, with respect to trapdoors in a two-
server setting. The main construction guarantees the privacy of a search, encrypted files, and aggregate keys.
Considering 5,000 encrypted files, the first construction can finish search within three seconds and the main
construction can finish search within six seconds.
INDEX TERMS Key-Aggregate Searchable Encryption, Searchable Encryption, Data Sharing and Prov-
able Security.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. BACKGROUND
A cloud storage service provides a solution for storing,
accessing, and sharing files over the Internet. However, such
a service may be vulnerable and hence leak stored data
without the permission or knowledge of the data owners. To
prevent this leakage, data owners would want to encrypt their
files before uploading them to a cloud storage. Searchable
encryption [1] allows users to search over encrypted data
with a chosen keyword without decryption of the encrypted
data. Searchable encryption is suitable for a storage of data
even in a vulnerable cloud storage service. In particular,
even if control of a storage is exploited by an adversary,
leakage of the stored data can be prevented by virtue of
encrypting the data. To maximize the capabilities of the cloud
and features of cloud storage, data owners should also be
able to share their files to intended recipients. In recent years,
several researchers [2]–[4] created schemes that authorize
other users to search over encrypted data, therefore sharing
the data without decryption in the multi-user setting as well
as encrypted search.
On this background, this paper aims to introduce a scheme
that authorizes for search in encrypted data, i.e., the search-
ability, efficiently. More specifically, suppose that a data
owner who owns a set of original data can issue a key that
enables other users to search in a subset of its encrypted data
without decryption. In such setting, the following features
are desirable: (1) the data owner issues only a single short
key that is independent of both the number of encrypted data
and the number of users who the encrypted data by the data
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FIGURE 1: Overview of Key-Aggregate Searchable Encryp-
tion (KASE)
owner, (2) and the encrypted data can be shared with users
without changing or reproducing the encrypted data. These
features can make the operations of a cloud storage service
efficient because the keys and encrypted data become easier
to manage for both a data owner and users. We note that these
features are not implied in previous systems, namely, multi-
user searchable encryption [5]–[8] and multi-key searchable
encryption [2], [4], which do not include efficient manage-
ment described above in their scope. Therefore, achieving the
features described above is a non-trivial problem.
Cui et al. [9] proposed key-aggregate searchable encryp-
tion (KASE) for the underlying purpose. An overview of
KASE is shown in Figure 1. In KASE, a data owner issues ag-
gregate keys that allow data users to search in authorized data
only, i.e., data users generate trapdoors to search in encrypted
data. The data sizes of ciphertexts and aggregate keys are
independent of the number of data users the ciphertexts will
be shared to, and the data size of ciphertexts is independent
of the number of users. Therefore, KASE can improve the
efficiency of the operations of a cloud storage service under
the problem setting described above.
However, Cui et al. did not provide formal definitions
of the security of KASE and its security proofs. Moreover,
Kiayias et al. [3] introduced an attack against the scheme
of Cui et al. in which encrypted keywords in ciphertexts are
distinguishable for an adversary. To the best of our knowl-
edge, no KASE scheme with formal security definitions and
proofs has been introduced, even in subsequent works [10],
[11], making it an open problem.
B. OUR CONTRIBUTIONS
In this paper, we propose KASE schemes with provable
security. To the best of our knowledge, these schemes are
the first provably secure constructions. We also define a
syntax and its security formally. We note that constructing
a provably secure KASE scheme is non-trivial. As will be
described in Section III-D in details, KASE requires a data
owner to control the searchability via only a single short key
and without changing ciphertexts for each user. The algebraic
structures that can be used to construct a KASE scheme
are limited by the use of the single short key and keeping
encrypted keywords. we will newly show that the scheme of
Cui et al. becomes insecure under our security definitions.
In contrast, by shedding light on the mathematical features
of the cryptographic primitives used to construct KASE,
we construct a provably secure KASE scheme by tactically
combining the existing instantiations of these cryptographic
primitives. As will be described in Section IV in details, some
instantiations of broadcast encryption [12], [13] and aggre-
gate signatures [14] are generally combined as basics. A
simple combination called first construction can provide key-
word privacy that guarantees the confidentiality of encrypted
keywords and aggregate key unforgeability that authorizes
the searchability of keywords from a data owner to users. In
addition to these two primitives, i.e., achieving the keyword
privacy and the aggregate key unforgeability, the use of secret
sharing [15] can provide trapdoor privacy that guarantees the
privacy of search for the users. We call the construction with
secret sharing as main construction.
Notably, computational cost and the size of ciphertexts in
the first construction are identical to those of the scheme by
Cui et al. [9], but the first construction is provably secure.
Considering 5,000 keywords, our two constructions can en-
crypt all keywords within one second, the first construction
can perform search within three seconds, and the main con-
struction can perform search within six seconds. We leave the
construction of a generic scheme based on any instantiation
of the primitives we used as an open problem.
C. POTENTIAL APPLICATIONS
KASE has many potential applications. We describe cloud-
assisted content-sharing networks with cryptography [16]
and privacy-preserving authenticated communication in
smart home environment [18] as example applications below.
Content sharing networks are networks that are scalable in
terms of the number of users, storage size, and network band-
width. Cloud-assisted content sharing networks with cryptog-
raphy mainly aim to enable both a service provider and users
to control the privacy of data flexibly and scalably. According
to Wu et al. [16], cloud-assisted content sharing networks
with cryptography allows: (1) an individual to freely produce
any number and any kind of online media, such as texts,
images, and videos; (2) an individual to grant any access
to his/her media to anyone at any time; (3) an individual to
reveal a large number of attributes (e.g., age, address, and
gender), some of which can be dynamic; and (4) an individual
to share contents using various devices and bandwidths, and
hence demand different access privileges for the same media.
Wu et al. proposed an instanton of cloud-assisted content
sharing networks with cryptography by utilizing attribute-
based encryption [17]. However, attribute-based encryption
does not provide the searchability for ciphertexts, and hence
the content of ciphertexts cannot be searched without de-
cryption. This limitation make may lose the users’ attention
due to the lack of the searchability for encrypted contents.
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Moreover, attribute-based encryption requires a trusted third-
party to generate secret keys, creating a potential single point
of failure in the entire system. Furthermore, the number of
secret keys increases with the number of attributes, and thus
the size of a storage and management cost of the keys also
increases with the number of users and the management of
authorization for content sharing. In contrast, KASE provides
searchability of contents of ciphertexts and a fixed size of
keys for both a data owner and users, solving the prob-
lems of cloud-assisted content-sharing networks described
above. Therefore, KASE is desirable for use in cloud-assisted
content-sharing networks.
The privacy-preserving authenticated communication in
smart home environment by Poh et al. [18] is an application
where a user can securely utilize smart devices that accu-
mulate private information, such as sleeping patterns and
medical information. Poh et al. realized such an application
in the single-user setting by integrating searchable encryp-
tion and authenticated key-establishment protocol. However,
smart devices are continuously becoming more popular, and
thus the use of smart devices in the multi-user setting should
be considered. For example, in a case with a large number
of users, e.g., employees in a workplace, each employee has
a separated data access per device. KASE can be used to
control access of each employee to devices and their data by
the use of a single key. Thus, a more efficient and attractive
usage of device management can be expected by virtue of
KASE.
D. RELATED WORKS
Following the original KASE proposed by Cui et al. [9],
many KASE schemes have been proposed in [10], [11], [19].
We note that the both schemes are essentially the same as
the construction by Cui et al. and their security have never
been proven. Liu et al. [11] introduced the verifiability of
search results, and Li et al. [10] discussed situations with
multiple data owners. Meanwhile, Mukti et al. [19] proposed
KASE with multiple data owners and discussed its security
formally. Unfortunately, their definitions are incomplete and
their proofs are wrong. In particular, in their syntax, any
keyword can be searched as long as the keyword is included
as a part of ciphertexts, even if its searched documents are the
outside of his/her authorized documents. Moreover, in their
proposed construction, the bilinear maps are nested for the
test algorithm, which is an unworkable setting for bilinear
maps.
As a special research alleviating the conditions of KASE,
Zhou et al. [20] proposed a searchable and secure scheme
in the situation where remote sensor devices encrypt data.
This scheme individually changes the key for aggregate key
issuance and the key for data encryption. However, this
feature raises an issue of increased key management for a
data owner. Patranabis et al. [21] also considered variants of
KASE, but their scheme has no search delegation to other
users. Therefore, the situation that KASE normally handles is
different, so it can be said that it is different from the problem
dealt with in this paper.
In a framework of conventional searchable encryption,
the multi-user setting [5]–[8], [22], [23] and the multi-key
setting [2], [4], [24] have been known to control the search-
ability for each document. However, an efficient control of
the searchability, such as issuance of aggregate keys which
is one of the main problems in KASE, is out of the scope of
such settings.
Searchable attribute-based encryption (SABE) [25]–[29] is
an encryption scheme similar to KASE. SABE is a searchable
encryption scheme in which documents corresponding to
attributes are searchable for users who own secret keys of
the attributes. While SABE provides searchability along with
attributes for each document, the size of secret keys depends
on the number of attributes, i.e., the key size is linear. This
problem in SABE is a different problem from KASE.
As additional related works, key-aggregate cryptosys-
tems [30]–[32] outsource the decryption of data. Among
them, Patranabis et al. [32] showed a provably secure scheme.
However, the searchability for ciphertexts is out of the scope
in these works. Since the searchability is not implied gener-
ally, constructing a provably secure KASE remains an open
problem.
1) Paper Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The mathemat-
ical background to understanding this work is described in
Section II, and then a definition of KASE and the technical
difficulty in constructing a KASE scheme is presented in
Section III. The main idea to overcome the difficulty and
the proposed KASE schemes are discussed in Section IV,
and then their security proofs are presented in Section V.
Implementation, evaluation, and analysis are discussed in
Section VI. Finally, the conclusion and future direction are
presented in Section VII.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we present the background to groups with
bilinear maps and their security assumptions.
A. BILINEAR MAPS
The proposed schemes are based on bilinear maps and bilin-
ear groups. In this paper, we recall the standard description
defined in [33]. Here, let G, H, and GT be groups with
the same prime order p. We then define bilinear groups
(G,H,GT ) and bilinear maps e : G×H→ GT as follows:
1) Bilinear groups (G,H,GT ) are two cyclic groups with
a prime order p.
2) g ∈ G and h ∈ H are generators of G and H,
respectively.
3) A bilinear map e : G × H → GT is a map with the
following properties:
a) Bilinearity. For any value u ∈ G, v ∈ H and
a, b ∈ Z∗p, e(ua, vb) = e(u, v)ab holds.
b) Non-degeneracy. e(g, h) 6= 1 holds, where 1
means an identity element over GT .
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c) Computability. For any value u ∈ G and h ∈ H,
e(u, v) can be calculated efficiently.
When G = H, bilinear groups are said to be symmetric and
denoted by (G,GT ) for the sake of convenience. Likewise,
G 6= H, bilinear groups are said to be asymmetric and
denoted by (G,H,GT ).
B. COMPLEXITY ASSUMPTIONS
In this section, we define security assumptions utilized in the
proposed schemes.
1) BDHE Assumption in (G,GT )
The bilinear Diffie-Hellman exponentiation (BDHE) as-
sumption in (G,GT ) is an assumption introduced by Boneh
et al. [12].
Definition 1 ((, l)-BDHE Assumption in (G,GT )). We say
the l-BDHE problem in (G,GT ) with a security parameter
1k as, for a given (g, h, gα, gα
2
, ..., gα
l
, gα
l+2
, ..., gα
2l
, Z)
with uniformly random (g, h) ∈ G, α ∈ Z∗p and (G,GT )
as input, determining whether Z ∈ GT is e(gαl+1 , h) or a
random value R. We say that a polynomial time algorithm A
can solve the l-BDHE problem in (G,GT ) with an advantage
 if the following relation holds:
|Pr[A(g, h,yg,α,l, e(gαl+1 , h),G,GT ) = 0]
−Pr[A(g, h,yg,α,l, R,G,GT ) = 0]| ≥ ,
where yg,α,l = (gα, gα
2
, ..., gα
l
, gα
l+2
, ..., gα
2l
). We say
the (, l)-BDHE assumption holds in (G,GT ) if there is
no polynomial-time algorithm that can solve the l-BDHE
problem in (G,GT ) with .
2) DHE Assumption in G
The Diffie-Hellman exponentiation (DHE) assumption in G
is an assumption introduced by Herranz et al. [34].
Definition 2 ((, l)-DHE Assumption in G). We say the l-
DHE problem with a security parameter 1k as, for a given
(g, gα, gα
2
, ..., gα
l
, gα
l+2
, ..., gα
2l
) with uniformly random
g ∈ G, α ∈ Z∗p and (G,GT ) as input, computing gα
l+1
. We
say that a polynomial time algorithm A can solve the l-DHE
problem in G with an advantage  if the following relation
holds:
Pr[A(g,yg,α,l, gαl+1 ,G,GT )] ≥ ,
where yg,α,l = (gα, gα
2
, ..., gα
l
, gα
l+2
, ..., gα
2l
). We say the
(, l)-DHE assumption holds in G if there is no polynomial-
time algorithm that can solve the l-DHE problem in G with
.
3) XDH Assumption in (G,H)
The external Diffie-Hellman (XDH) assumption in (G,H)
is an assumption introduced in [35], [36]. Note that, unlike
the BDHE assumption and the DHE assumption described
above, the XDH assumption holds on only asymmetric bilin-
ear groups (G,H,GT ).
Definition 3 (-XDH Assumption in (G,H)). We say the
XDH problem in (G,H) as, for a given (g, h, ga, gb, Z)
with uniformly random g ∈ G, h ∈ H, (a, b) ∈ Z∗p and
(G,H,GT ) as input, determining whether Z ∈ G is gab or is
a random value R. We say that a polynomial time algorithm
A can solve XDH problem in (G,H) with advantage  if the
following relation holds:
|Pr[A(g, h, ga, gb, gab,G,H,GT ) = 0]
−Pr[A(g, h, ga, gb, R,G,H,GT ) = 0]| ≥ .
We say -XDH assumption holds in (G,H) if there is no
polynomial-time algorithm that can solve the XDH problem
in (G,H) with .
III. KEY-AGGREGATE SEARCHABLE
ENCRYPTION(KASE)
In this section, we describe the main problem statement of
key-aggregate searchable encryption (KASE) [9]. Then, we
newly define a syntax of algorithms and the security for
KASE. These definitions are our contributions.
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT
In key-aggregate searchable encryption (KASE) [9], a data
owner provides a “single-and-short” aggregate key that en-
ables a user to access documents for authorization of search.
Each user, which we call data user for the sake of conve-
nience, is given an aggregate key as secret information and
then generates a “single-and-short” trapdoor to search for
a keyword from the documents. In doing so, the following
requirements should be satisfied by KASE:
• Searchability: A user can generate trapdoors for any
keyword to search in encrypted documents.
• Compactness: The size of both aggregate keys and
trapdoors should be independent of the number of doc-
uments and number of users. In addition, the size of en-
crypted keywords should be independent of the number
of users.
• Keyword Privacy: An adversary cannot extract informa-
tion about the original keywords from encrypted docu-
ments. That is, a person who does not have an aggregate
key corresponding to indexes of the documents cannot
get any information from the encrypted keyword.
• Aggregate Key Unforgeability: An adversary cannot
search for any keyword without authorization from a
data owner. That is, an adversary cannot perform key-
word search over the documents that are not related to
the known aggregate key and it cannot generate new
aggregate keys for other sets of documents from the
known keys.
These requirements are also shown in the original work
of KASE [9]. The compactness and the searchability are
functionality for KASE while the keyword privacy and the
aggregate key unforgeability are security for KASE.
As described above, the compactness must be satisfied
because the main motivation of KASE is to keep aggregate
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keys and trapdoors short while providing the searchability.
We note that the size of encrypted keywords may depend
on the number of documents because the data size of the
encrypted keywords with respect to the number of users
is the out of the scope of efficient. The keyword privacy
is a requirement that prevents an adversary from getting
information contained in encrypted documents. Meanwhile,
aggregate key is a new notion required in KASE and has not
been discussed in general searchable encryption. However,
because documents outside the scope of authorization should
be unsearchable, the aggregate key unforgeability should be
discussed. Even if the keyword privacy is satisfied, there is
a possibility that an adversary can search documents outside
the scope of authorization. Thus, both the keyword privacy
and the aggregate key unforgeability should be discussed.
As another security requirement, the following should be
considered:
• Trapdoor Privacy: An adversary cannot determine a
keyword embedded in the given trapdoor. That is, even
when a user asks an untrusted cloud server to search, the
server cannot obtain the keyword except for the search
result.
We note that the trapdoor privacy is an additional security
requirement, i.e., only a few schemes [3], [37], [38] satisfy
the trapdoor privacy even in the conventional searchable
encryption. However, satisfying the trapdoor privacy is an
important feature. When keywords embedded in trapdoors
are revealed, the original keywords can be analyzed from
encrypted documents by looking up the search results. In
other words, if the trapdoor privacy is unsatisfied, then the
keyword privacy may be threatened. Thus, we consider that
a KASE scheme should satisfy all requirements described
above.
To the best of our knowledge, no provably secure KASE
scheme or formal security definitions have been proposed.
Thus, in this paper, we define the requirements above for-
mally.
B. ALGORITHMS
The algorithms of KASE are defined as follows:
• params ← Setup(1λ, n): This algorithm is run by a
cloud service provider to set up the scheme. On input
of a security parameter 1λ and the maximum number
n of possible documents owned by a data owner, the
algorithm outputs a public parameter params.
• sk ← KeyGen(params): This algorithm is run by a
data owner to generate a secret key sk.
• ci,l ← Encrypt(params, sk, i, wl): This algorithm is
run by a data owner to encrypt a keyword which belongs
to the ith document and generate an encrypted keyword.
On input of the data owner’s secret key sk, an document
index i and a keyword wl ∈ KS whereKS is a keyword
space, the algorithm outputs an encrypted keyword ci,l.
• kagg ← Extract(params, sk, S): This algorithm is
run by a data owner to generate an aggregate key for
delegating the keyword search capability for a certain
set of documents to other data users. On input of the
data owner’s secret key sk and a set S of indexes
of documents, the algorithm outputs an aggregate key
kagg .
• Tr ← Trapdoor(params, kagg, S, wl): This algorithm
is run by a data user who performs the keyword search.
On input of an aggregate key kagg and a keyword wl,
the algorithm outputs a single trapdoor Tr.
• Tri ← Adjust(params, i, S, Tr, {f1,i}i∈[1,m1]): This
algorithm is run by a cloud server to adjust the given
aggregate trapdoor for each document. On input of
a set S of indexes of documents, the index i of the
target document, an aggregate trapdoor Tr and auxiliary
functions {fi}i∈[1,m1](m1 ∈ N) possibly, the algorithm
outputs each trapdoor Tri for the ith target document in
S.
• b ← Test(params, Tri, S, ci,l, {f2,i}i∈[1,m2]): This
algorithm is run by a cloud server to perform keyword
search over an encrypted document. On input of a trap-
door Tri, the document index i and auxiliary functions
{fi}i∈[1,m2](m2 ∈ N) possibly, the algorithm outputs
true or false to denote whether the ith document
contains the keyword wl.
We note that the syntax above represents a multi-server
setting that includes multiple cloud servers. The syntax can
contain multiple servers by setting auxiliary functions sepa-
rately for each cloud server in the Adjust and Test algorithms.
We define the correctness of the syntax of KASE as
follows:
Definition 4 (Correctness). For any document containing
the keyword wl with index i ∈ S, We say that a KASE
scheme satisfies the correctness if the following statement
holds: for all 1λ, n ∈ N, i ∈ [1, n], wl ∈ KS, when a public
parameter params ← Setup(1λ, n) and a secret key sk ←
KeyGen(params), ci,l ← Encrypt(params, sk, i, wl) are
used, Test(params, Tri, S, ci,l, {f2,i}i∈[1,m2]) = true
if Tr ← Trapdoor(params, kagg, S, wl) and Tri ←
Adjust(params, i, S, Tr, {f1,i}i∈[1,m1]).
The correctness defined above imposes the searchability
of KASE because the correctness guarantees that a data user
can search for any keyword without decryption. Moreover,
the syntax described above is identical to the abstraction of
the algorithms proposed in the original work of KASE [9]
except that the symmetric key setting instead of the public
key setting in [9].
We define the compactness of KASE as follows:
Definition 5 (Compactness). We say that KASE satisfies the
compactness if the sizes of both aggregate keys and trapdoors
are independent of the number n of encrypted documents and
the number m of data users, i.e., O(1) with respect to n and
m, and the size of encrypted keywords is independent of m,
i.e., O(n) with respect to n and m.
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C. SECURITY DEFINITIONS
In this section, we define three security requirements for
KASE, namely, the keyword privacy, the aggregate key
unforgeability, and the trapdoor privacy. The security re-
quirements are defined by the following game between an
adversaryA and a challenger C. For each game, both C andA
are given (1λ, n) as input,A is allowed to get aggregate keys,
encrypted keywords, and trapdoors in the query phase by
accessing the key extraction oracle OExtract, the encryption
oracle OEncrypt, and the trapdoor oracle OTrapdoor, respec-
tively. In particular, A accesses each oracle as follows:
• OExtract: by taking S ⊆ [1, n] as input, return kagg ←
Extract(params, sk, S).
• OEncrypt: by taking i ∈ [1, n], wl ∈ KS as input, return
ci,l ← Encrypt(params, sk, i, wl).
• OTrapdoor: by taking S ⊆ [1, n], wl ∈ KS as input, re-
turn Tr ← Trapdoor(params,Extract(params, sk, S),
S, wl).
Definition 6 ((, n)-Keyword Privacy). In this game, an
adversary A tries to distinguish a challenge keyword or a
random keyword from a challenge encrypted keyword.
• Init: A declares the index i∗ ∈ [1, n] of a challenge
document used in the guess phase and sends it to C.
• Setup: C generates params← Setup(1λ, n) and sk ←
KeyGen(params), and sends params to A.
• Query: A can query to OExtract at most n − 1 times1
and can query to OEncrypt at arbitrary times. Here,
when A queries to OExtract, it imposes the constraint
S ⊆ [1, n] \ {i∗}.
• Guess: A declares a challenge keyword wl∗ and sends
it to C. C randomly chooses θ ∈ {0, 1}. If θ = 0, then C
sets wθ = wl∗ . Otherwise, i.e., θ = 1, C sets a random
keyword as wθ, where |w0| = |w1|. C sends ci∗,θ ←
Encrypt(params, sk, i∗, wθ) toA.A then selects θ′ ∈
{0, 1}.
We say KASE satisfies the (, n)-keyword privacy if the fol-
lowing relation holds forA’s advantage with any probabilis-
tic polynomial time algorithm and 1λ with any sufficiently
large size:
Adv := |Pr[θ = θ′]− 1/2| < 
Definition 7 ((, n)-Aggregate Key Unforgeability). In this
game, an adversary A tries to forge a valid aggregate key
whereA can search encrypted documents with the aggregate
key.
• Setup: C randomly chooses i∗ ∈ [1, n]. C gen-
erates params ← Setup(1λ, n) and sk ←
KeyGen(params), and then sends params, i∗ to A.
• Query:A can query toOExtract at most n−1 times and
can query toOEncrypt at arbitrary times. Here, whenA
queries to OExtract, it imposes the constraint i∗ 6∈ S.
1If A can access to OExtract more than n times, A can generate
trapdoors for every index. A can trivially break any scheme without loss
of generality. The restriction is also necessary for the remaining definitions.
• Forge: A outputs S∗ ⊆ [1, n] and k∗agg , where S∗
includes i∗, i.e., i∗ ∈ S∗.
We say KASE satisfies the (, n)-aggregate key unforge-
ability if the following relation holds for A’s advantage with
any probabilistic polynomial time algorithm, keyword wl and
1λ with any sufficiently large size:
Adv := Pr[Test(params,Adjust(params, i∗, S∗,
T rapdoor(params, k∗agg, S
∗, wl))) = Test(params,
Adjust(params, i∗, S∗, T rapdoor(params,Extract
(params, sk, S∗), S∗, wl)))] < 
Definition 8 ((, n)-Trapdoor Privacy). In this game, an
adversary A tries to distinguish a challenge keyword or a
random keyword from the given challenge trapdoor.
• Init: A declares a set S∗ ⊆ [1, n] of indexes and a
challenge keyword wl∗ used in the guess phase, and
sends it to C.
• Setup: C generates params← Setup(1λ, n) and sk ←
KeyGen(params), and then sends params to A.
• Query:A can query toOTrapdoor at most n−|S∗| times
and can query to OEncrypt at arbitrary times. Here,
when A queries to OEncrypt, it imposes the constraint
wl 6= wl∗ ∧ i 6∈ S∗.
• Guess: C randomly chooses θ ∈ {0, 1}. If θ = 0 then
C sets wθ = wl∗ . Otherwise, i.e., θ = 1, C sets a
random keyword as wθ, where |w0| = |w1| holds. C
sends Tr∗ ← Trapdoor(params, k∗agg, S∗, wθ) to A.
A then selects θ′ ∈ {0, 1}.
We say KASE satisfies the (, n)-trapdoor privacy if the
following relation holds for A’s advantage with any prob-
abilistic polynomial time algorithm and 1λ with any suffi-
ciently large size:
Adv := |Pr[θ = θ′]− 1/2| < 
D. TECHNICAL DIFFICULTY
Although one might think that the conventional searchable
encryption [1], [39], [40] can perform the same search as
KASE, the number of secret keys possessed to a data user
and the number of trapdoors are proportional to the number
of documents stored in cloud. Thus, the compactness cannot
be satisfied.
The intuition of KASE’s difficulty lies in the trade-off
between security and features. That is, there is a possibility
that security cannot be satisfied if the focus is only satisfying
the compactness. In the case of KASE, the algebraic structure
is limited because the sizes of aggregate key and trapdoor
need to be O(1) regardless of the number of documents and
the number of users. Therefore, potential configurations that
satisfy searchability are limited, and it has been shown that
the KASE scheme of Cui et al. does not satisfy keyword pri-
vacy [3]. Furthermore, for the trapdoor privacy, the aggregate
key must already have a concrete algebraic structure, and thus
a trapdoor that uses only the aggregate key necessarily has
more restrictive algebraic structures. This makes the trapdoor
privacy even more difficult to satisfy. The KASE scheme of
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Cui et al. also does not satisfy the trapdoor privacy (see the
Appendix for details).
IV. CONSTRUCTIONS
In this section, we propose two constructions, namely, the
first construction and the main construction, following the
security requirements described in Section III-C. The first
construction satisfies the keyword privacy and the aggre-
gate key unforgeability. The main construction satisfies the
trapdoor privacy in addition to the keyword privacy and the
aggregate key unforgeability.
A. IDEA
Our main idea of KASE is to combine broadcast encryption
(BE) [12], [13] and aggregate signatures (AS) [14]. BE is
an encryption scheme that allows a specified set of users to
decrypt ciphertext whereby a set of indexes corresponding
to the user index is embedded in ciphertexts. Intuitively,
the searchability can be realized by treating a decryption
algorithm of BE as a test algorithm of KASE. The keyword
privacy can then be satisfied by utilizing the ciphertext se-
curity of BE. Furthermore, we construct an aggregate key in
the form of AS [14]. The signature size can be aggregated to
a fixed length regardless of the number of users, and hence
the compactness can be satisfied by keeping the construction
of AS in aggregate keys. This also implies that the aggregate
key unforgeability can be satisfied via the unforgeability of
AS.
When we considered the idea of combining BE and AS,
we found that the BE proposed by Boneh et al. [12] and the
AS proposed by Boneh et al. [14] could be combined. Our
first construction is close to a simple combination and can
be constructed by a single server. However, trapdoor is out
of the scope in this construction, i.e., the trapdoor privacy is
unsatisfied.
For this reason, we also propose the main construction that
satisfies the trapdoor privacy. In our main construction, we
embed random values in trapdoors to make the trapdoors
probabilistic. In doing so, to satisfy the searchability with the
trapdoors, it is necessary to embed the same random values
in encrypted keywords on a cloud. However, if the random
values are sent to the cloud, the cloud can also extract the
original keywords from the given trapdoor. Thus, we further
utilize the idea of secret sharing for these random values. We
also prepare for two servers that do not collude with each
other. A data user distributes the random values embedded in
the trapdoors into two shares, and then sends the shares to
each server individually. By constructing the test algorithm
in a way such as n-out-of -n threshold decryption [41], [42],
the random values can be embedded in encrypted keywords
and public parameters without knowing the original random
values themselves. The approach described above allows
search in ciphertexts and satisfies the trapdoor privacy.
B. FIRST CONSTRUCTION
The algorithms for the first construction are as follows:
• params ← Setup(1λ, n): Generate B =
(p,G,GT , e(·, ·)) as a bilinear map and bilinear groups,
where p is an order such that G and 2λ < p <
2λ+1. Set n as the maximum number of documents.
For i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n, n + 2, ..., 2n}, pick a random
generator g ∈ G and a random α ∈ Zp, and then
compute gi = g(α
i) ∈ G. Select a one-way hash
function H : {0, 1}∗ → G. Finally, output a public
parameter params = (B, PubK,H), where PubK =
(g, g1, ..., gn, gn+2, ..., g2n) ∈ G2n.
• sk ← KeyGen(params): Pick a random β ∈ Zp and
output a secret key sk = β.
• ci,l ← Encrypt(params, sk, i, wl): Pick a random
ti,l ∈ Zp and output an encrypted keyword ci,l =
(c1,i,l, c2,i,l, c3,i,l) by computing the following:
c1,i,l = g
ti,l , c2,i,l = (g
β · gi)ti,l , c3,i,l = e(H(wl), g)
ti,l
e(g1, gn)ti,l
.
• kagg ← Extract(params, sk, S): For the given subset
S ⊆ [1, n] which contains the indexes of documents,
output an aggregate key kagg by computing the follow-
ing:
kagg = Πj∈Sg
β
n+1−j .
• Tr ← Trapdoor(params, kagg, S, wl): For all docu-
ments relevant to the given aggregate key kagg , generate
a single trapdoor Tr for the keyword wl by computing
the following:
Tr = kagg ·H(wl).
• Tri ← Adjust(params, i, S, Tr): For each document
in the given set S, output trapdoor Tri by computing the
following:
Tri = Tr ·Πj∈S,j 6=ign+1−j+i.
• b ← Test(params, Tri, S, ci,l): For the ith document
and the keyword embedded in Tri, output true or false
by judging whether the following equation holds or not:
e(Tri, c1,i,l)
e(c2,i,l, pub)
=? c3,i,l,
where pub = Πj∈Sgn+1−j .
The first construction described above satisfies the correct-
ness, i.e., the searchability, because equation (1) holds.
Furthermore, the sizes of an aggregate key and a trapdoor
are |G| independent of the number of indexes in S because
kagg = Πj∈Sg
β
n+1−j ∈ G and Tr = kagg · H(wl) ∈ G.
A search over encrypted keywords can be executed without
changing the encrypted keywords themselves for any key-
word. Hence, the first construction satisfies the compactness.
We will show that the first construction satisfies the key-
word privacy and the aggregate key unforgeability in Sec-
tion V-A. The first construction does not satisfy the trapdoor
privacy because trapdoors are deterministic with respect to
keywords. In other words, an adversary can extract keywords
from trapdoors when the keywords used-so-far are sent again.
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e(Tri, c1,i,l)
e(c2,i,l, pub)
=
e(Πj∈Sg
β
n+1−j ·H(wl) ·Πj∈S,j 6=ign+1−j+i, gti,l )
e((gβ · gi)ti,l ,Πj∈Sgn+1−j)
=
e(Πj∈Sg
β
n+1−j , g
ti,l ) · e(H(wl), gti,l ) · e(Πj∈S,j 6=ign+1−j+i, gti,l )
e(gβti,l ,Πj∈Sgn+1−j) · e(gti,li ,Πj∈Sgn+1−j)
=
e(Πj∈Sgn+1−j , gβti,l ) · e(H(wl), gti,l ) · e(Πj∈S,j 6=ign+1−j+i, gti,l )
e(Πj∈Sgn+1−j , gβti,l ) · e(Πj∈Sgn+1−j+igti,l )
=
e(H(wl), g
ti,l ) · e(Πj∈S,j 6=ign+1−j+i, gti,l )
e(Πj∈Sgn+1−j+i, gti,l )
=
e(H(wl), g
ti,l ) · e(Πj∈Sgn+1−j+i, gti,l )
e(Πj∈Sgn+1−j+i, gti,l ) · e(gn+1.gti,l )
=
e(H(wl), g
ti,l )
e(gn+1.g
ti,l )
=
e(H(wl), g)
ti,l
e(g1.gn)
ti,l
. (1)
In the next subsection, we will introduce the main construc-
tion, which satisfies the trapdoor privacy, under a two-server
setting.
C. MAIN CONSTRUCTION
To construct a scheme that satisfies the trapdoor privacy,
random values should be embedded in trapdoors. Likewise,
the same random values should be embedded in the encrypted
keyword and public parameters to satisfy the correctness.
Intuitively, the approach to use random values in trapdoors
seems to require a data user to send the same random val-
ues to a cloud. However, if the data user sends the same
random value as those in trapdoors, the cloud can extract
kagg ·H(wl) from the given trapdoors and the random values.
Consequently, the trapdoor privacy is unsatisfied.
To overcome this limitation, instead of sending random
values to a cloud, we aim to send the random values in a
manner that nobody except for a data user itself can extract.
Simultaneously, embedding the random values in encrypted
keywords and a public parameter on the cloud without reveal-
ing the random values themselves. To do this, we construct
trapdoors by using secret sharing. Consider a data user that
distributes random values into two shares and then sends the
shares to two servers. By utilizing these shares, a cloud can
embed the random values in encrypted keywords and a public
parameter without knowing the random values themselves.
In the main construction that will be described below, two
servers Cmain and Caid are assumed to be semi-honest and
to not collude with each other without loss of generality.
Both servers store the same encrypted keywords. When a data
user generates a trapdoor, he/she also generates a random
value r and embeds r in the resulting trapdoor. The data
user then distributes r into two shares and sends either of the
shares to Cmain and Caid, respectively. After receiving the
trapdoor and the share, Cmain and Caid embed the received
share in the stored encrypted keyword and public parameter
provisionally. Then, these values are gathered on the Cmain
side. Cmain then combines the encrypted keywords and the
public parameter with the shares to recover r. That is, Cmain
can obtain the encrypted keywords and the public parameter
where the random r is embedded without knowing r itself.
Consequently, Cmain is able to search in encrypted files and
return the search results to the data user.
The main construction is described as follows. The asym-
metric bilinear map is used in the main construction to satisfy
the trapdoor privacy. Furthermore, in the Adjust and Test
algorithms, we instantiate a function f : Zp × G → G
and fT : Zp × GT → GT as auxiliary functions of the
input defined in Section III-B. f is a function that takes two
arbitrary inputs x ∈ Zp, g ∈ G and outputs gx ∈ G. fT is
a function that takes two arbitrary inputs x ∈ Zp, gT ∈ GT
and outputs gxT ∈ GT .
• params ← Setup(1λ, n): Generate a bilinear map
group system B = (p,G,H,GT , e(·, ·)), where p is
the order of G,H and 2λ < p < 2λ+1. Set n as the
maximum possible number of documents that belong
to a data owner. Pick a generator g ∈ G, h ∈ H
and a random α ∈ Zp, and then compute gi =
g(α
i) ∈ G for i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n, n + 2, ..., 2n}, hi =
h(α
i) ∈ H for i ∈ [1, n]. Select a one-way hash
function H : {0, 1}∗ → G. Finally, output a public
parameter params = (B, PubK,H), where PubK =
(g, g1, ..., gn, gn+2, ..., g2n, h, h1, ..., hn) ∈ (G2n ×
Hn+1).
• sk ← KeyGen(params): Pick a random β ∈ Zp and
output a secret key sk = β.
• ci,l ← Encrypt(params, sk, i, wl): Pick a random
ti,l ∈ Zp and output an encrypted keyword ci,l =
(c1,i,l, c2,i,l, c3,i,l) by computing the following:
c1,i,l = h
ti,l ∈ H,
c2,i,l = (g
β · gi)ti,l ∈ G,
c3,i,l =
e(H(wl),h)
ti,l
e(g1,hn)
ti,l
∈ GT .
• kagg ← Extract(params, sk, S): For the given subset
S ⊆ [1, n] which contains the indexes of documents,
output an aggregate key kagg by computing the follow-
ing:
kagg = Πj∈Sg
β
n+1−j ∈ G.
• Tr ← Trapdoor(params, kagg, S, wl): Randomly
generate r ∈ Zp and calculate Tr = (kagg ·H(wl))r ∈
G. Then, r is broken into r = rmain + raid, and
Trmain = (Tr, rmain), T raid = raid.
• Tri ← Adjust(params, i, S, Tr, f(rmain, pubi), f(raid,
pubi)): Calculate pubi = Πj∈S,j 6=ign+1−j+i ∈ G on
the two servers. Caid sends f(raid, pubi) = pubraidi
to Cmain. Next, Cmain calculates (f(rmain, pubi)) ·
(f(raid, pubi)) = pub
rmain
i · pubraidi = pubri and
calculates Tri = Tr · pubri ∈ G.
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• b← Test(params, Tri, S, ci,l, fT (rmain, c#2,i,l), fT (raid,
c#2,i,l), fT (rmain, c3,i,l), fT (raid, c3,i,l)): Calculate pub =
Πj∈Shn+1−j ∈ H and c#2,i,l = e(c2,i,l, pub) on the two
servers. Caid sends fT (raid, c#2,i,l) = e(c2,i,l, pub)raid
to Cmain. Next, Cmain calculates (fT (rmain, c#2,i,l)) ·
(fT (raid, c
#
2,i,l)) = e(c2,i,l, pub)
rmain ·e(c2,i,l, pub)raid =
e(c2,i,l, pub)
r. In addition, Caid sends fT (raid, c3,i,l) =
craid3,i,l to Cmain. Then, Cmain calculates (fT (rmain, c3,i,l))·
(fT (raid, c3,i,l)) = c
rmain
3,i,l · craid3,i,l = cr3,i,l and outputs
true or false by judging whether the following equa-
tion holds or not:
e(Tri, c1,i,l)
e(c2,i,l, pub)r
=? cr3,i,l.
The main construction satisfies the correctness, i.e., the
searchability, as shown in equation (2).
Furthermore, similar to the first construction, the sizes
of an aggregate key and a trapdoor are |G| independent of
the number n of indexes in S. In addition, the data size of
encrypted keywords is independent of the number of users
because the algorithms do not change the encrypted key-
words themselves. Thus, the main construction also satisfies
the compactness.
V. SECURITY PROOFS
In this section, we will show the security proofs of the first
construction and main construction. The security of the main
construction is proved in the two-server setting because it
uses to servers. The proof statement is consistent with the
security definitions because our definitions have captured
the multi-server setting by applying an auxiliary function
individually for each server.
A. PROOFS OF THE FIRST CONSTRUCTION
The first construction satisfies the (′, n)-keyword privacy
and the (′, n)-aggregate key unforgeability. In this section,
we prove these two securities.
Theorem 1 ((′, n)-Keyword Privacy). The first construction
satisfies the (′, n)-keyword privacy under the (, n)-BDHE
Assumption, where  ≥ ′.
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A, whose ad-
vantage is ′, against the first construction. We then build
an algorithm B that solves the BDHE problem. Let C be a
challenger for the BDHE problem. Algorithm B proceeds as
follows.
• Init: A declares challenge file index i∗ ∈ [1, n] and
sends it to C.
• Setup: C sends (g, h, g1, g2, ..., gn, gn+2, ..., g2n, Z)
to B. B randomly generates sk = β and cal-
culates v′ = gβg−1i∗ . B sends params =
(g, g1, g2, ..., gn, gn+2, ..., g2n) to A.
• Query: When A queries for OExtract, B responds as
follows:
– If an aggregate key for i∗ ∈ S is queried, return ⊥.
– If an aggregate key for i∗ 6∈ S is queried, return
kagg = (Πj∈Sg
β
n+1−j) · (Πj∈Sgn+1−j+i∗)−1 =
Πj∈Sg
β−αi∗
n+1−j . If j = i
∗, (Πj∈Sgn+1−j+i∗)−1 can-
not be calculated, but it can be calculated because
of i∗ 6∈ S.
When A queries for OEncrypt, B randomly gener-
ates ti,l ∈ Z∗p, calculates the following ci,l =
(c1,i,l, c2,i,l, c3,i,l) and responds to A (c1,i,l =
gti,l , c2,i,l = (v
′ · gi)ti,l , c3,i,l = e(H(wl),g)
ti,l
e(g1,gn)
ti,l
).
• Guess:A declares the challenge keyword wl∗ and sends
it to B. B calculates the challenge encrypted keyword
c1,i∗,θ = h, c2,i∗,θ = h
β , c3,i∗,θ =
e(H(wl∗ ),h)
Z .
Here, we define h = gt (t is a random value). Then,
when Z = e(gn+1, h), c1,i∗,θ = gt = h, c2,i∗,θ =
((gβg−1i∗ ) · gi∗)t = gβt = hβ , c3,i∗,θ = e(H(wl∗ ),g)
t
e(g1,gn)t
=
e(H(wl∗ ),h)
e(gn+1,h)
= e(H(wl∗ ),h)Z . Therefore, the calculation
results are identical to the results of the Encrypt al-
gorithm of the first construction. B sends ci∗,θ =
(c1,i∗,θ, c2,i∗,θ, c3,i∗,θ) to A. A chooses θ′ ∈ {0, 1} and
sends it to B. Then, B sends θ′ to C as a guess of θ.
In the guess phase, if Z is a random value, then Pr[θ = θ′] =
1/2. On the other hand, if Z = e(gn+1, h), then |Pr[θ =
θ′] − 1/2| > ′. This indicates that B has an advantage over
′ for solving the (, n)-BDHE problem. Thus, if the (, n)-
BDHE assumption holds, the first construction satisfies the
(′, n)-keyword privacy.
Theorem 2 ((′, n)-Aggregate key Unforgeability). The first
construction satisfies the (′, n)-aggregate key unforgeability
under the (, n)-DHE Assumption, where  = ′.
Proof. Suppose there exists as adversary A, whose ad-
vantage is ′, against the first construction. We then build
an algorithm B that solves the DHE problem. Let C be a
challenger for the DHE problem. Algorithm B proceeds as
follows.
• Setup: C sends (g, gα, gα2 , ..., gαn , gαn+2 , ..., gα2n)
to B. B randomly generates sk = β and cal-
culates v′ = gβg−1i∗ . B sends params =
(g, g1, g2, ..., gn, gn+2, ..., g2n) to A.
• Query: When A queries for OExtract, B responds as
follows:
– If an aggregate key for i∗ ∈ S is queried, return ⊥.
– If an aggregate key for i∗ 6∈ S is queried, return
kagg = (Πj∈Sg
β
n+1−j) · (Πj∈Sgn+1−j+i∗)−1 =
Πj∈Sg
β−αi∗
n+1−j . Here, if j = i
∗, then (Πj∈Sgn+1−j+i∗)−1
cannot be calculated, but it can be calculated be-
cause of i∗ 6∈ S.
When A queries for OEncrypt, B randomly generates
ti,l ∈ Z∗p, calculates ci,l = (c1,i,l, c2,i,l, c3,i,l) and
responds toA (c1,i,l = gti,l , c2,i,l = (v′ · gi)ti,l , c3,i,l =
e(H(wl),g)
ti,l
e(g1,gn)
ti,l
).
• Forge: A outputs S∗, k∗agg and sends them to B.
– If i∗ 6∈ S∗, abort
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e(Tri, c1,i,l)
e(c2,i,l, pub)r
=
e(Πj∈Sg
βr
n+1−j ·H(wl)r ·Πj∈S,j 6=igrn+1−j+i, hti,l )
e((gβ · gi)ti,l ,Πj∈Shrn+1−j)
=
e(Πj∈Sg
βr
n+1−j , h
ti,l ) · e(H(wl)r, hti,l ) · e(Πj∈S,j 6=igrn+1−j+i, hti,l )
e(gβti,l ,Πj∈Shrn+1−j) · e(g
ti,l
i ,Πj∈Sh
r
n+1−j)
=
e(Πj∈Sgrn+1−j , h
βti,l ) · e(H(wl)r, hti,l ) · e(Πj∈S,j 6=igrn+1−j+i, hti,l )
e(Πj∈Sgrn+1−j , h
βti,l ) · e(Πj∈Sgrn+1−j+i, hti,l )
=
e(H(wl)
r, hti,l ) · e(Πj∈S,j 6=igrn+1−j+i, hti,l )
e(Πj∈Sgrn+1−j+i, h
ti,l )
=
e(H(wl)
r, hti,l ) · e(Πj∈Sgrn+1−j+i, hti,l )
e(Πj∈Sgrn+1−j+i, h
ti,l ) · e(grn+1.hti,l )
=
e(H(wl)
r, hti,l )
e(grn+1, h
ti,l )
=
e(H(wl), h)
rti,l
e(g1.hn)
rti,l
= cr3,i,l (2)
– If i∗ ∈ S∗, k∗agg = (Πj∈S,j 6=i∗gn+1−j)β−α
i∗ ·
(gn+1−i∗)β−α
i∗
. By using this k∗agg , B calculates
(3) and outputs results.
The result in the above (′, n)-aggregate key unforgeability
game is identical to the answer of the (, n)-DHE problem.
That is, the advantage of the (′, n)-aggregate key unforge-
ability game is equal to the advantage of the (, n)-DHE
problem. Thus, if the (, n)-DHE assumption holds, the first
construction satisfies the (′, n)-aggregate key unforgeability.
B. PROOFS OF THE MAIN CONSTRUCTION
In this section, we prove that the main construction satisfies
the (′, n)-trapdoor privacy. Note that the (′, n)-keyword
privacy and the (′, n)-aggregate key unforgeability can be
proved similarly to the proofs for the first construction ex-
cept for the use security assumptions in asymmetric bilinear
groups (see the Appendix for details). As described in the
previous section, the main construction is based on two
servers. In our security proof, a challenge ciphertext and a
challenge trapdoor for both Cmain and Caid are simulated by
a reduction algorithm.
Theorem 3 ((′, n)-Trapdoor Privacy). Let a hash function
H be modeled as a random oracle. The main construction
satisfies the (′, n)-trapdoor privacy under the -XDH as-
sumption, where  ≥ ′.
Proof. Suppose there exists as adversary A, whose ad-
vantage is ′, against the main construction. We then build
an algorithm B that solves the XDH problem. Let C be a
challenger for the XDH problem. Algorithm B proceeds as
follows.
• Init: A declares challenge file index set S∗ ⊆ U and
challenge keyword wl∗ and sends them to C.
• Setup: C sends (g, h, ga, gb, Z) to B. B randomly gen-
erates α, ω, r′main ∈ Z∗p and calculates gi = gα
i
(i ∈
{1, 2, ..., n, n + 2, ..., 2n}), hi = hαi(i ∈ [1, n + 1]).
ω is used to generate both a response from the random
oracle H and the challenge trapdoor. Simultaneously,
r′main corresponds to rmain of the challenge trapdoor.
In this proof, the random value r of challenge trapdoor is
mapped to the challenge a of ga. In doing so, calculating
r′aid = a − r′main is necessary in accordance with
the Trapdoor algorithm. However, since B does not
know a, B cannot calculate r′aid itself. Then, instead of
calculating r′aid as behavior for Caid in the challenge
phase, B calculates the value including r′aid as Caid.
Specifically, B calculates ga · g−r′main = ga−r′main =
gr
′
aid and generates the value including gr
′
aid as the
behavior of Caid. This implicitly means that, in the
main construction, Caid, who receives raid, embeds raid
in e(c2,i,l, pub), pubi and c3,i,l in the Adjust and Test
algorithms. To execute the Adjust and Test algorithms
correctly for the challenge trapdoor, Caid is also consid-
ered to use the following values:
pub∗ = Πj∈S∗hn+1−j ,
pub∗i = Πj∈S∗,j 6=i(g
r′aid)α
n+1−j+i
(i ∈ S∗).
Next, B calculates the following values:
c′#2,i,l = (Z · gbr
′
main) · (gr′aid)αi(i ∈ S∗),
Ai = e(c
′#
2,i,l, pub
∗),
B = e((g
r′aid )ω,h)
e(gr
′
aid ,hn+1)
= ( e(g
ω,h)
e(g1,hn)
)r
′
aid .
These values are used to calculate encrypted keywords,
which satisfy the correctness for the challenge trapdoor.
B sends params = (g, g1, g2, ..., gn, gn+2, ..., g2n, h, h1, h2, ..., hn)
to A. Here, B does not know sk = b because it is a part
of the secret of the challenge.
• Hash: When A queries for random oracle model, B re-
sponds as follows. Note that B has a hash list L(wl, yl).
In the initial state, L is an empty set.
– If wl is in L, return the corresponding yl stored in
L.
– If wl is not in L, setting yl as follows, add (wl, yl)
to L and return yl.
∗ If wl = wl∗ , let yl = gω .
∗ Ifwl 6= wl∗ , choose x ∈ Z∗p uniformly randomly
and let yl = gx.
• Query: If A queries for OEncrypt, B returns as follows:
– If A queries for a keyword which satisfies wl =
wl∗ ∨ i ∈ S∗, return ⊥.
– If A queries for a keyword which satisfies wl 6=
wl∗ ∧ i 6∈ S∗, randomly generate ti,l ∈ Z∗p
and return ci,l = (c1,i,l, c2,i,l, c3,i,l) (c1,i,l =
hti,l , c2,i,l = (g
b · gi)ti,l , c3,i,l = e(H(wl),h)
ti,l
e(g1,hn)
ti,l
)
If A queries for OTrapdoor, B randomly generate r ∈
Z∗p and calculate Tr = (Πj∈S(gb)α
n+1−j · H(wl))r =
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(Πj∈S∗,j 6=i∗gn+1−j)β · (Πj∈S∗,j 6=i∗gn+1−j+i∗ )−1 · (gn+1−i∗ )β
k∗agg
=
(Πj∈S∗,j 6=i∗gn+1−j)β · (Πj∈S∗,j 6=i∗gn+1−j+i∗ )−1 · (gn+1−i∗ )β
(Πj∈S∗,j 6=i∗gn+1−j)β · (Πj∈S∗,j 6=i∗gn+1−j)−αi∗ · (gn+1−i∗ )β · (gn+1−i∗ )−αi∗
= (gn+1−i∗ )α
i∗
= gα
n+1−i∗+i∗
= gα
n+1
(3)
(Πj∈Sgbn+1−j · H(wl))r. Then, B randomly generates
rmain ∈ Z∗p and calculates raid = r − rmain. B returns
(Tr, rmain) to A.
• Guess: B calculates the challenge trapdoor as Tr∗ =
Πj∈S∗Zα
n+1−j · (ga)ω . At this time, if Z = gab, Tr =
Πj∈S∗(gab)α
n+1−j · (ga)ω = (Πj∈S∗gbn+1−j · gω)a
holds. From the simulation of the hash phase,H(wl∗) =
gω holds, and therefore Tr = (Πj∈S∗gbn+1−j ·H(wl∗))a
holds. Therefore, Tr has the same distribution as that
calculated by the Trapdoor algorithm in the main con-
struction. B sends Tr∗ and r′main to A. A then chooses
θ′ ∈ {0, 1} and returns it to B. Finally, B returns the
received θ′ to C as a guess of θ.
Note that if Z = gab, not only the trapdoor generated in
the query phase but also the challenge trapdoor satisfies the
correctness.
In the guess phase, if Z is a random value, then Pr[θ =
θ′] = 1/2. On the other hand, if Z = gab, then |Pr[θ =
θ′]−1/2| = Adv > ′. This indicates that B has an advantage
over ′ for solving the -XDH problem. Thus, if the -XDH
assumption holds, the main construction satisfies the (′, n)-
trapdoor privacy.
VI. DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss performance of our proposed
schemes. We first implement the proposed schemes to mea-
sure their actual performance. Next, we theoretically com-
pare the computational cost and the storage cost of the pro-
posed schemes with those of related works. We also compare
the security features with related works.
A. IMPLEMENTATION AND PERFORMANCE
We implement the first construction and the main construc-
tion to evaluate the performance of each algorithm. The
implementation environment and performance evaluation are
as follows:
1) Implementation Environment
In our implementation, we use the mcl library version 0.942,
which is a C++ library for pairing computation. We also use
the BLS12-381 curves. The curves are asymmetric bilinear
maps, and hence the parameters in the first construction are
dually generated for each input group of the bilinear maps.
We also evaluate each cryptographic operation in the C++
platform with Mac OS named Mojave. In our environment,
CPU is 1.4 GHz Intel Core i5-4260U and memory is 4 GB
1600 MHz DDR3. We note that the communication latency
2mcl library: https://github.com/herumi/mcl
to interact between Cmain and Caid in the main construction
is not measured because the communication process between
Cmain and Caid is not implemented due to the lack of com-
munication function in the mcl library.
2) Performance Evaluation
The results of the performance evaluation of our schemes
are shown in Figures 2-7. Among the KASE algorithms,
the Setup, Encrypt, and Extract algorithms are common to
the first construction and the main construction because the
mcl library supports asymmetric bilinear maps. Thus, the
evaluation of these algorithms, i.e., Figures 2-4, contains only
the first construction. The results shown in Figures 2-4 are
common also for those in the main construction. On the other
hand, the results of the Adjust and Test algorithms listed
in Figures 6-7 do not include the communication latency
between the two servers in the main construction.
The execution time of the Setup algorithm is linear with
respect to the maximum number of documents belonging to
a single owner. When the number of documents increases
to 5,000, the Setup algorithm only needs one millisecond of
execution time and therefore remains reasonable.
The execution time of the Encrypt algorithm is linear with
respect to the number of keywords. The execution time of
the Encrypt algorithm is larger than those of other algorithms
because of the use of bilinear maps with heavy calculations.
Nevertheless, when the number of documents increases to
5,000, the execution time of the Encrypt algorithm finishes
within one second and is therefore still practical .
The execution time of the Extract algorithm is linear with
respect to the number of shared documents. When the num-
ber of documents increases to 5,000, the Extract algorithm
needs only 0.07 milliseconds of execution time. The Extract
algorithm can be performed faster than the other algorithms.
The execution time of the Trapdoor algorithm is constant
with respect to the number of documents, i.e., 0.07 millisec-
onds in the first construction and 0.2 milliseconds in the main
construction. The difference in the execution time depends on
the number of scalar multiplications. In particular, the first
construction does not utilize scalar multiplication, whereas
the main construction utilizes a single scalar multiplication.
Since the data sizes of rmain and raid are small because of
integers, the entire execution time can be minimized even
when the communication latency is included.
The execution time of the Adjust algorithm is linear with
respect to the number of documents. When the number of
documents increases to 5,000, the Adjust algorithm takes
only 0.06 milliseconds in the first construction and only 0.18
milliseconds in the main construction. Similar to the Extract
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algorithm, the Adjust algorithm in the first construction can
be performed faster than the other algorithms. In the main
construction, the Adjust algorithm includes scalar multiplica-
tions and hence the computation is slightly heavy. However,
we note that the computations for Cmain and Caid can be
done in parallel to improve the performance. Although we
did not implement the parallelization, this could improve the
performance twice faster.
The execution time of the Test algorithm is linear with
respect to the number of encrypted keywords. When the
number of documents increases to 5,000, the algorithm takes
three seconds in the first construction and six seconds in
the main construction. Similar to the Encrypt algorithm, the
high cost is caused by the use of bilinear maps, which is a
bottleneck in all algorithms that use it. However, the search
process can be fully parallelized because it is individual
for each encrypted keyword. Thus, the performance can be
improved by parallelization, e.g., by the use of the OpenMP
library3.
Finally, search for any keyword is a summation of the exe-
cution times of the Trapdoor, Adjust, and Test algorithms. For
instance, a search in 5,000 encrypted keywords is executed
within about three seconds in the first construction and about
six seconds in the main construction.
3OpenMP library: https://www.openmp.org/wp-content/uploads/cspec20.
pdf
B. COMPUTATIONAL AND STORAGE COST ANALYSIS
In this section, we compare the computational cost and the
storage cost of our schemes with other schemes [9], [11],
[20] of KASE. The results are shown in Tables 1 and 2. Li et
al. [11] proposed two constructions, i.e., the single-owner set-
ting and the multi-owner setting. Therefore, we only compare
our schemes in the single-owner setting because our schemes
have a single-owner setting.
The computational cost and the storage size for the first
construction are less-than-or-equal to those of the schemes
by Cui et al. [9] and by Li et al. [11] in spite of achieving the
provable security, which is an open problem in these works.
Even in the main construction, the computational cost for
the Encrypt algorithm is identical to that of the scheme by
Cui et al. [9], and the computational cost for the Trapdoor
algorithm is smaller than that of the scheme by Zhou et
al. [20]. Although the computational costs for the Adjust and
Test algorithms are greater than those of other schemes, the
number of scalar multiplications in G and exponentiations in
GT , whose computations are heavy, are constant with respect
to the number of documents. Thus, the computational cost
of the main construction can be considered to be practical.
Moreover, for the storage cost, in spite of two additional
components in Zp, the storage size is fairly identical to that
of the scheme by Zhou et al. In particular, an element in G
is constructed by two integers on an elliptic curve, i.e., x-
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Cui et al. [9] Li et al. [11] Zhou et al. [20] First Construction Main Construction
Encrypt
Th + 2Tsm + Ta+
2Tp + Tmul + Texp
Th + 2Tsm + 2Ta + 2Tp+
Tmul + 2Texp + Tx + Tbf
Th + 4Tsm + Ta
Th + 2Tsm + Ta+
2Tp + Tmul + Texp
Th + 2Tsm + Ta+
2Tp + Tmul + Texp
Trapdoor Th + Ta Th + Ta Th + 3Tsm + Ta Th + Ta Th + Ta + Tsm
Adjust + Test
2|S| · Ta+
Tmul + 2Tp
2|S| · Ta+
Tmul + 2Tp
2|S| · Ta+
2Tmul + 4Tp
2|S| · Ta+
Tmul + 2Tp
6|S| · Ta + 2|S| · Tmul+
4Tsm + 2Texp + 2Tp
TABLE 1: The computational cost of KASE: The operation time of hash operations, scalar multiplication, point addition, exclu-
sive or in GT , exponentiation in GT , multiplication in GT , and pairing operation are identified as Th, Tsm, Ta, Tx, Texp, Tmul,
and Tp, respectively. Li et al. [11] uses a Bloom filter to verify whether the keyword really exists in the document set. The
time taken for the operation is represented as Tbf . The random generation and integer addition are ignored. The time of
Adjust+ Test refers to the computational cost that takes file per one index.
Cui et al. [9] Li et al. [11] Zhou et al. [20] First Construction Main Construction
encrypted keyword 2|G|+ |GT | 2|G|+ 3|GT | 3|G| 2|G|+ |GT | 3|G|+ 2|GT |
trapdoor |G| |G| 2|G| |G| |G|+ 2|Z∗p|
aggregate key |G| |G| |G| |G| |G|
TABLE 2: The storage cost of KASE: |G|, |GT | refers to the size of G,GT .
coordinate and y-coordinate, whose bit lengths are the same
as the bit length of an element in Zp. Thus, the entire bit
length of 2Zp is equal to that of G. The main construction
can achieve a similar storage size as other works.
As will be discussed in detail in the next subsection, the
performance of the proposed schemes described above has
been achieved as well as the provable security, which is the
open problem in the existing works.
C. SECURITY
In this section, we discuss the security required in KASE.
The results are shown in Table 3.
In Table 3, the schemes by Cui et al. [9] and by Li et
al. [11] do not satisfy the keyword privacy, the aggregate key
unforgeability, and the trapdoor privacy. On the other hand,
the scheme by Zhou et al. [20], the first construction, and
the main construction satisfy the keyword privacy. Although
Cui et al. and Li et al. have discussed the keyword privacy
informally, their discussions do not include the provable
security with reduction algorithms. As a result, the security
can be broken through our oracle-based definitions (see the
Appendix for details).
Although the scheme by Zhou et al. satisfies the keyword
privacy and the trapdoor privacy, it does not satisfy the com-
pactness. Zhou et al.’s scheme assumes a special situation
where a remote sensor device encrypts its sensing data. This
requires each sensor device to have an extra key for encryp-
tion, and the number of keys increases linearly with respect
to the number of sensors when viewed across the system.
Thus, the compactness cannot be satisfied. We also note that
the scheme by Zhou et al. deals with a problem different
from ours. Moreover, the aggregate key unforgeability has
not been discussed explicitly in other works.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed provably secure KASE scheme
and defined the security of KASE formally. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first paper to provide a formal security
discussion of KASE. Our main idea was to combine broad-
cast encryption and aggregate signatures, and we proposed
the scheme called first construction by combining the broad-
cast encryption scheme by Boneh et al. and the aggregate
signature scheme by Boneh et al. The security is provably
secure with respect to the keyword privacy under the BDHE-
assumption and the aggregate key unforgeability under the
DHE assumption. Furthermore, by constructing trapdoors
that utilize random numbers distributed via secret sharing,
we proposed another scheme called main construction that
satisfies the trapdoor privacy. We then implemented the pro-
posed schemes and showed that both schemes could encrypt
5,000 keywords within one second. Moreover, a search in the
5,000 keywords can be executed within about three seconds
in the first construction and about six seconds in the main
construction. These results show that the proposed schemes
are practical while achieving provably security. As future
work, we plan to propose a generic construction through any
broadcast encryption and any aggregate signatures because
the proposed schemes in this paper are based on the specific
constructions described above. We also plan to optimize
implementation, e.g., parallelization of processes, to improve
the performance of the proposed schemes.
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APPENDIX. VULNERABILITY OF THE SCHEME BY CUI
ET AL.
The scheme by Cui et al. [9] does not satisfy the key-
word privacy because random values embedded in encrypted
keywords are common for every keywords. We show an
example where the scheme by Cui et al. is broken un-
der our definition of the keyword privacy below. In the
game of the keyword privacy, an adversary can request
an encrypted keyword to the encrypt oracle before receiv-
ing a challenge encrypted keyword. Then, the adversary
chooses a keyword wl′ before the guess phase, and re-
quests ci∗,l′ = (c1,i∗,l′ , c2,i∗,l′ , c3,i∗,l′) for encrypt oracle.
After that, by receiving the challenge encrypted keyword
ci∗,θ = (c1,i∗,θ, c2,i∗,θ, c3,i∗,θ), the adversary can extract the
keyword from the challenge encrypted keyword as follows:
c3,i∗,θ/c3,i∗,l′ = e(H(wθ), g)/e(H(wl′), g)
Because the adversary knows the challenge keyword
and its resulting H(wl∗) and H(wl′), the adversary
can know whether either one of the challenge key-
word or the random keyword is encrypted by calculating
e(H(wl∗), g)/e(H(wl′), g). Thus, when a common random
value is embedded in multiple encrypted keywords, i.e., the
construction of the scheme by Cui et al., keywords can be
extracted from the encrypted keywords.
Moreover, the scheme by Cui et al. does not satisfy
the trapdoor privacy because trapdoor is deterministic with
respect to a given keyword. We show an example where
the scheme by Cui et al. is broken under the definition of
the trapdoor privacy. In the game of the trapdoor privacy,
an adversary can request trapdoors to the trapdoor oracle
before receiving a challenge trapdoor. Then, the adversary
chooses a keyword wl′ before the guess phase, and requests
Tr′ = k∗agg · H(wl′) to the trapdoor oracle. After that,
by receiving the challenge trapdoor Tr∗ = k∗agg · H(wθ),
the adversary can extract the keyword from the challenge
trapdoor as follows:
(Tr∗ ·H(wl′))/Tr′ = H(wθ)
Thus, if trapdoors are deterministic, keywords can be extract
from multiple trapdoors.
APPENDIX. PROOFS OF MAIN CONSTRUCTION
A. COMPLEXITY ASSUMPTIONS
First, we define the l-(D-)BDHE assumption [43]. This is an
assumption in asymmetric bilinear groups.
Definition 9 ((, l)-(D-)BDHE Assumption in (G,H,GT )).
We say the l-(D-)BDHE problem in (G,H,GT ) with a secu-
rity parameter 1k as, for a given (g, gα, gα
2
, ..., gα
l
, gα
l+2
, ...,
gα
2l
, h, hs, α, s ∈ Z∗p and (G,H,GT ) as input, determining
whether Z ∈ GT is e(gαl+1 , hs) or a random value R. We
say that a polynomial time algorithm A can solve the l-(D-
)BDHE problem in (G,H,GT ) with an advantage  if the
following relation holds:
|Pr[A(g, h, hs,yg,h,α,l, e(gl+1, hs)) = 0]
−Pr[A(g, h, hs,yg,h,α,l, R) = 0]| ≥ ,
where yg,h,α,l = (g1, ..., gl, gl+2, ..., g2l). We say the l-
(D-)BDHE assumption holds in (G,H,GT ) if there is no
polynomial-time algorithm that can solve the l-(D-)BDHE
problem in (G,H,GT ) with .
The difference of the assumption described above from the
assumption is only the input, i.e., h ∈ G for the l-BDHE
assumption and gs for the l-(D-)BDHE assumption. Namely,
the notation of the input is different.
Next, we define l-BDHE assumption and l-DHE assump-
tion in asymmetric bilinear groups. We use these assumptions
for the security proofs of the main construction. We note
that the l-BDHE assumption in asymmetric bilinear groups
is naturally extended from the l-(D-)BDHE assumption. In
particular, in the following assumptions, when G = H and
g = h, the l-BDHE assumption in (G,H,GT ) is identical
to the l-(D-)BDHE assumption in this section and the l-
DHE assumption in (G,H,GT ) is identical to the l-DHE
assumption in Section II-B.
Definition 10 ((, l)-BDHE Assumption in (G,H,GT )). We
say the l-BDHE problem in (G,H,GT ) with a security pa-
rameter 1k as, for a given (g, gs, gα, gα
2
, ..., gα
l
, gα
l+2
, ..., gα
2l
,
h, hs, hα, hα
2
, ..., hα
l
, Z) with uniformly random g ∈
G, h ∈ H, α, s ∈ Z∗p and (G,H,GT ) as input, determining
whether Z ∈ GT is e(gαl+1 , hs) or a random value R.
We say that a polynomial time algorithm A can solve the
l-BDHE problem in (G,H,GT ) with an advantage  if the
following relation holds:
|Pr[A(g, gs, h, hs,yg,h,α,l, e(gl+1, hs)) = 0]
−Pr[A(g, gs, h, hs,yg,h,α,l, R) = 0]| ≥ ,
where yg,h,α,l = (g1, ..., gl, gl+2, ..., g2l, h1, ..., hl). We say
the l-BDHE assumption holds in (G,H,GT ) if there is no
polynomial-time algorithm that can solve the l-BDHE prob-
lem in (G,H,GT ) with .
Definition 11 ((, l)-DHE Assumption in (G,H)). We say
the l-DHE problem in (G,H) with a security parameter 1k
as, for a given (g, gα, gα
2
, ..., gα
l
, gα
l+2
, ..., gα
2l
, h, hα, hα
2
, ..., hα
l
)
with uniformly random g ∈ G, h ∈ H, α ∈ Z∗p and
(G,H,GT ) as input, computing gα
l+1
. We say that a poly-
nomial time algorithm A can solve the l-DHE problem in
(G,H) with an advantage  if the following relation holds:
Pr[A(g,yg,h,α,l, gαl+1)] ≥ ,
where yg,h,α,l = (gα, gα
2
, ..., gα
l
, gα
l+2
, ..., gα
2l
, hα, hα
2
, ...,
hα
l
). We say the l-DHE assumption holds in (G,H) if there
is no polynomial-time algorithm that can solve the l-DHE
problem in (G,H) with .
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B. PROOF FOR KEYWORD PRIVACY
In this section, we show that the main construction satisfies
the keyword privacy.
Theorem 4 ((′, n)-Keyword Privacy). The main construc-
tion satisfies the (′, n)-keyword privacy under the (, n)-
BDHE assumption in (G,H,GT ), where  ≥ ′.
Proof. Suppose there exists as adversary A, whose advan-
tage is ′, against the main construction. We then build an
algorithm B that solves the BDHE problem in (G,H,GT ).
Let C be a challenger for the BDHE problem in (G,H,GT ).
Algorithm B proceeds as follows.
• Init: A declares a challenge file index i∗ ∈ [1, n] and
sends it to C.
• Setup: C sends (g, gs, g1, g2, ..., gn, gn+2, ..., g2n, h, hs,
h1, h2, ..., hn, hn+2, ..., h2n, Z) to B. B randomly gen-
erates sk = β and calculates v′ = gβg−1i∗ . B sends
params = (g, g1, g2, ..., gn, gn+2, ..., g2n, h, h1, h2, ..., hn)
to A.
• Query: When A queries for OExtract, B responds as
follows:
– If an aggregate key for i∗ ∈ S is queried, returns
⊥.
– If an aggregate key for i∗ 6∈ S is queried, returns
kagg = (Πj∈Sg
β
n+1−j) · (Πj∈Sgn+1−j+i∗)−1 =
Πj∈Sg
β−αi∗
n+1−j . Note that, if j = i
∗, (Πj∈Sgn+1−j+i∗)−1
cannot be calculated, but it can be calculated be-
cause of i∗ 6∈ S.
When A queries for OEncrypt, B randomly gener-
ates ti,l ∈ Z∗p, calculates the following ci,l =
(c1,i,l, c2,i,l, c3,i,l) and responds to A (c1,i,l =
hti,l , c2,i,l = (v
′ · gi)ti,l , c3,i,l = e(H(wl),h)
ti,l
e(g1,hn)
ti,l
).
• Guess:A declares the challenge keyword wl∗ and sends
to B. B calculates the challenge encrypted keyword
c1,i∗,θ = h
s, c2,i∗,θ = (g
s)β , c3,i∗,θ =
e(H(wl∗ ),h
s)
Z .
Then, when Z = e(gn+1, hs), c1,i∗,θ = hs, c2,i∗,θ =
((gβg−1i∗ ) · gi∗)s = gβs = (gs)β , c3,i∗,θ =
e(H(wl∗ ),h)
s
e(g1,hn)s
= e(H(wl∗ ),h
s)
e(gn+1,hs)
= e(H(wl∗ ),h
s)
Z . There-
fore, the calculation results are identical to the Encrypt
algorithm of the main construction. B sends ci∗,θ =
(c1,i∗,θ, c2,i∗,θ, c3,i∗,θ) to A. A chooses θ′ ∈ {0, 1} and
sends it to B. Then, B sends θ′ to C as a guess of θ.
In the guess phase, if Z is a random value, then Pr[θ = θ′] =
1/2. On the other hand, if Z = e(gn+1, hs), |Pr[θ = θ′] −
1/2| > ′. This indicates that B has an advantage over ′
for solving the (, n)-BDHE problem in (G,H,GT ). Thus, if
the (, n)-BDHE assumption holds in (G,H,GT ), the main
construction satisfies the (′, n)-keyword privacy.
C. PROOF FOR AGGREGATE KEY UNFORGEABILITY
In this section, we show that the main construction satisfies
the aggregate key unforgeability.
Theorem 5 ((′, n)-Aggregate key Unforgeability). The
main construction satisfies the (′, n)-aggregate key unforge-
ability under the (, n)-DHE Assumption in (G,H), where
 = ′.
Proof. Suppose there exists as adversary A, whose ad-
vantage is ′, against the main construction. We then build
an algorithm B that solves the DHE problem. Let C be a
challenger for the DHE problem. Algorithm B proceeds as
follows.
• Setup: C sends (g, g1, g2, ..., gn, gn+2, ..., g2n, h, h1, h2,
..., hn, hn+2, ..., h2n) to B. B randomly generates sk =
β and calculates v′ = gβg−1i∗ . B sends params =
(g, g1, g2, ..., gn, gn+2, ..., g2n, h, h1, h2, ..., hn) to A.
• Query: When A queries for OExtract, B responds as
follows:
– If an aggregate key for i∗ ∈ S is queried, returns
⊥.
– If an aggregate key for i∗ 6∈ S is queried, returns
kagg = (Πj∈Sg
β
n+1−j) · (Πj∈Sgn+1−j+i∗)−1 =
Πj∈Sg
β−αi∗
n+1−j . Here, if j = i
∗, then (Πj∈Sgn+1−j+i∗)−1
cannot be calculated, but it can be calculated be-
cause of i∗ 6∈ S.
When A queries for OEncrypt, B randomly generates
ti,l ∈ Z∗p, calculates ci,l = (c1,i,l, c2,i,l, c3,i,l) and
responds toA (c1,i,l = hti,l , c2,i,l = (v′ · gi)ti,l , c3,i,l =
e(H(wl),h)
ti,l
e(g1,hn)
ti,l
).
• Forge: A outputs S∗, k∗agg and sends them to B.
– If i∗ 6∈ S∗, abort
– If i∗ ∈ S∗, k∗agg = (Πj∈S,j 6=i∗gn+1−j)β−α
i∗ ·
(gn+1−i∗)β−α
i∗
. By using this k∗agg , B calculates
(Πj∈S∗,j 6=i∗gn+1−j)β ·(Πj∈S∗,j 6=i∗gn+1−j+i∗)−1 ·
(gn+1−i∗)β/k∗agg = g
α+1 and outputs results.
The result in the above (′, n)-aggregate key unforgeability
game is identical to the answer of the (, n)-DHE problem
in (G,H). That is, the advantage of the aggregate key un-
forgeability game is equal to the advantage of the (, n)-
DHE problem in (G,H). Thus, if the (, n)-DHE assumption
holds, the main construction satisfies the (′, n)-aggregate
key unforgeability.
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